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ABSTRACT 
 
FOUNDATION FOR AN UPCOMING STUDY ON RISK PERCEPTION AND PROPER 
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT USE OF GSU LABORATORY WORKERS 
 
By 
 
JACQUAN JAMEL JORDAN  
 
10/24/2017 
 
 
INTRODUCTION:  There have been 1,141 laboratory acquired infections between the period 
of 1979-2005 according to the American Biological Safety Association. This substantial number 
of infections represents a risk for laboratory workers. These laboratory infections are not 
frequent in all laboratories and it has been concluded that “human errors represent a very high 
percentage of the cases.” (Wurtz et al, 2016) The research shows that this human error is a result 
of flawed risk perception and poor biosafety habits.  
 
AIM: The aim of this thesis is to build a constructive foundation for a future study on risk 
perception and biosafety habits of GSU laboratory workers. This thesis will accomplish this goal 
by conducting a literature review on factors that contribute to biosafety habits and risk 
perception, editing of the survey tool, and pilot interviews using the completed survey tool.  
 
METHODS: This thesis contains a narrative literature review of research during 1995 to the 
present conducted on biosafety training, biosafety habits (including personal protective 
equipment use), and laboratory acquired infections. This literature explains the factors that 
contribute to worker’s risk perception and improper use of personal protective equipment. The 
results of the literature review were utilized to create a survey tool for the upcoming research. 
Finally, this survey tool was pilot tested with two top researchers at the university.   
 
RESULTS:  The literature review conducted for this thesis highlighted the lack of consistency 
of biosafety habits, risk perception, and training in biosafety laboratory workers. Additionally, 
the findings of the literature suggest that laboratory acquired infections represent a real risk for 
workers who have poor biosafety habits. Thus, the literature suggests that a future study on the 
biosafety habits and risk perception of GSU laboratory workers is essential. The results of 
editing the survey tool and the pilot interview will help facilitate this future study.  
 
DISCUSSION: Laboratory acquired infections represent a real risk for laboratory workers who 
do not follow proper biosafety habits, do not receive the proper biosafety training, or have poor 
judgement on risk perception. It is necessary to understand the biosafety habits of GSU 
laboratory workers to ensure that there is not a higher risk of laboratory acquired infections. 
Thus, the future study conducted by Dr. Lisa Casanova, with this thesis as a foundation, will be 
critical in investigating the current practices of GSU laboratory workers and their potential risk.  
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1.) Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
  
 Laboratory acquired infections represent a serious occupational hazard for laboratory 
workers working with infectious agents in research laboratories.  According to a study conducted 
by Karen Byers of the American Biological Safety Association there have been 1,141 laboratory 
acquired infections reported worldwide during the period of 1979 to 2005. (ABSA, 2005) 
Additional updated information gathered by Ms. Byers since 2005 has shown that number 
increased to 2033 infections. These numbers indicate a serious hazard for laboratory workers. 
These infections can be avoided by properly adhering to biosafety habits that prevent direct 
contact to infectious agents. Laboratory workers that are infected are not adhering to proper 
biosafety requirements for many reasons. The current literature suggests that some laboratory 
workers are not provided adequate training, make poor judgement in perceiving risk of the 
infectious agents they are working with, and do not fully utilize the personal protective 
equipment provided for them. Georgia State University has biosafety laboratories ranging from 
level 1-4 and work with infectious agents from as innocuous as E. coli to the very dangerous B 
virus. The level of threat associated with each biological agent increases with the corresponding 
biosafety level. Level 1 represents the lowest risk and level 4 corresponds with the most severe 
risk. These university workers are at risk if they are not practicing proper biosafety habits.  
 The purpose of this thesis is to build the foundation for a study into the current personal 
protective equipment habits, training, and risk perception of Georgia State laboratory workers. 
This includes the piloting and editing of the survey tool that will be used to investigate the 
personal protective equipment habits and risk perception of university laboratories and a 
literature review on all the factors that contribute to laboratory acquired infections. This 
information will be used in conjunction with laboratory management, if necessary, to create 
constructive changes in biosafety requirements to decrease the risk of laboratory acquired 
infections. This thesis, pilot interviews, and literature review will be used to support the final 
study.   
 
1.2 Definitions Related to Study 
 
Biosafety- the maintenance of safe conditions in biological research to prevent harm to workers, 
nonlaboratory organisms, or the environment. 
BSL- Biosafety Level  
CDC- Center for Disease Control and Prevention  
LAI- Laboratory Acquired Infections 
NOISH- National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health  
PAPR- Powered Air Purifying Respirator  
 
 
1.3 Aim of Study 
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Develop and pilot a structured interview/survey tool to investigate the use of personal protective 
equipment, biosafety training, and safety incidents in research university animal laboratory 
workers.  
 
Survey the literature has on laboratory acquired infections, employee risk perception, biosafety 
training and personal protective equipment use to inform the interview/survey tool. 
 
 
2.) Literature Review  
More and more researchers have begun to investigate the exposure and rates of infection 
for laboratory workers, particularly those working with animals. The major pathway of infection 
discovered in these studies so far has been the respiratory pathway. Through the respiratory 
pathway laboratory workers are exposed to fungi, bacteria, viruses, and animal allergens that can 
cause infections to the workers exposed (Duc et al, 2008) However, a recent international study 
conducted on 23 different biosafety level 3 and 4 laboratories by Wurtz et al found that, “The 
analysis of the survey reveals that laboratory-acquired infections have been infrequent and even 
rare in recent years, and human errors represent a very high percentage of the cases.” (Wurtz et 
al, 2016) Additionally, the study found that most of these infections (87%) were in laboratory 
technicians and those working with micro biotic organisms. Thus, the scope of this literature 
review was to collect recent and relevant information on what contributes to the risk perception 
of laboratory workers in acquiring laboratory infection and improper use of personal protective 
equipment that contribute to these infections. Risk perception and biosafety habits can be 
influenced by multiple factors; however, the literature indicates three measurable potential 
reasons: training protocols and laboratory biosafety culture for animal laboratory workers, the 
dissemination of existing information regarding infections acquired by biosafety laboratory 
workers, and effectiveness of popularly used personal protection equipment in animal 
laboratories.   
2.1 Training and Laboratory Culture  
The personal protective equipment required to work in a biosafety laboratory is generally 
uniform according to the biosafety level, however, the amount of training on the personal 
protective equipment and how to work in these laboratories varies greatly. There are no set 
training structures for laboratory management to abide by. A recent framework of guidance for 
biosafety level 4 laboratories was established by Duc et al, this framework was put together by 
studying BSL-4 laboratories and found, “that the BSL-4 laboratory director is the key person 
most responsible for ensuring that staff members are appropriately prepared for BSL-4 
operations.”(Duc et al, 2008) The authors suggested this particular biosafety level requires at 
least didactic, one-on-one, and mentored on the job training for each employee working in the 
laboratory. This becomes problematic for individuals who are working in a biosafety level 2, 3 or 
4 especially, because Duc et al also found that, “BSL-4 laboratory orientation training assumes 
that the person has already mastered all procedures for safe and secure handling of infectious 
agents at the BSL-2 and ideally BSL-3 levels.” (Duc et al, 2008) Thus, individuals who were 
improperly trained at the biosafety level before, will never receive proper training in the previous 
biosafety level. This will build an unsteady foundation of biosafety habits and may eventually 
lead to an incident in the laboratory.  
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Training varies from laboratory to laboratory and largely depends on what industry the 
laboratory is funded by. There are three major funding sources for laboratories: academic, 
government, and private laboratories.  In 2008, there was a survey of biosafety professionals who 
work in BSL-2 and BSL-3 laboratories conducted by Chamberlain et al. The authors of this study 
were trying to identify the variance in biosafety training and incident reporting that existed in 
each category of laboratories. The study surveyed a total of 258 eligible members of the 
American Biological Safety Association, who mostly identified themselves as biosafety officers 
or environmental health officers.  Fifty-two percent were from academia, 16% worked for the 
government, and 23% worked for private industry. The survey showed that most laboratories 
required some form of biosafety training and about 75% had a biosafety officer. Additionally, the 
study showed that 93% of the BSL-3 and 73% of the BSL-2 laboratories receive an annual 
biosafety inspection by their biosafety officer. However, the authors left the definition of 
biosafety training to the laboratory protocol that the responder works in. The results of the 
detailed questions on specific training situation illustrates the variance in training. Those who 
work in BSL-2 laboratories indicated that 23% of the institutions performed drills or activities 
for hazardous spills and only 7% had activities for hands on training regarding needle-stick 
incidents. Most indicated that didactic training was the method used for teaching new employees 
about needle-stick incidents. This represents a potential issue for these laboratories, because 
these individuals may not be able to practice the proper biosafety habits without hands on 
practice. The proper balance of didactic, one-on-one, and mentored hands on training is required 
to prevent all incidents. However, the study illustrates that most BSL-2 laboratories current 
biosafety training only utilizes didactic training. The study also found that 73% of the study 
respondents indicated that there was a biosafety officer responsible for maintaining a protocol for 
reporting incidents. However, only “Forty-four percent of respondents indicated that within the 
last 12 months, their institutions have created and disseminated at least one newsletter, e-
newsletter, or flyer that addressed biosafety issues.” Therefore, there is a disconnect on how this 
information is collected and how it is disseminated to the employees. These employees need to 
get this information to continuously comply with new biosafety regulations and to learn from 
mistakes others may have made regarding their biosafety practices. This study highlights the lack 
of regulated biosafety training in BSL-2 laboratories in academia, government, and private 
industry. The authors suggest that it may be time to “develop industry-wide biosafety 
competencies that offer more detailed and uniform guidance about what each laboratory worker 
should be expected to know and demonstrate [and] certain practices such as posting incident-
reporting protocols in accessible places such as biosafety websites and turning laboratory 
incidents into shared lessons learned are likely to improve biosafety regardless of the biosafety 
level of the laboratory.”(Chamberlain et al, 2008) These two suggestions will be effective in 
creating uniformity in the training provided for each individual, however there also must be a 
change in the laboratory culture that affects biosafety behavior.  
In addition to being responsible for the biosafety training, laboratory management is also 
responsible for the biosafety culture of the laboratory. This can be thought of in lay terms, as the 
strictness of the laboratory management. However, this is important because it can greatly 
influence the risk perception of the individuals who work in the laboratory. A study conducted 
by Ozsahin et al in 2006 surveyed 84 individuals who work in research and clinical laboratories 
to identify safety awareness in laboratories workers. The study showed that only 67.9% of the 
individuals washed their hands after each procedure, 36.9% answered correctly on waste disposal 
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questions, and only 69% answered correctly on protective habits. These findings highlighted the 
authors suggestion that “that regular education about laboratory safety must be provided as part 
of professional education programs and after their completion” (Ozsahin et al, 2006) This regular 
education that the author suggests is a part of the culture that laboratory management must 
maintain for proper biosafety practices. Another study conducted by Arezes and Miguel in 2008 
sought to investigate the occupational hazards of worker safety habits. This study was conducted 
on participants that used hearing protection devices as their personal protective equipment. The 
authors sought to determine when the participants felt like it was necessary to wear these 
devices. 516 industrial workers from both genders and all education levels were surveyed and the 
authors found that “individual risk perception of the considered workers’ sample, and other 
perceptual-cognitive factors, seem to be important predictors of their safety behavior.” (Arezes et 
al, 2008) The authors also found that the workers were poor judges of their perceived risk. This 
study highlights that employees cannot be trusted to be the judges of when specific personal 
protective equipment is used. The risk should instead be established by occupational health 
regulations or in the case of laboratories, biosafety professionals, who are trained in determining 
the need for personal protective equipment. This will lead to great compliance in biosafety and 
lessen the possibilities of laboratory inquired infections and other biosafety incidents.  
2.2 Laboratory infections acquired by animal laboratory workers  
The existence of acquired infections by laboratory workers has been examined for 
decades and has become an increasingly important topic in biosafety. This information has not 
been properly circulated in biosafety laboratories to reinforce the need for proper personal 
protective equipment practices. “The largest survey of infections was reported in 1976 by Pike, 
who found that 4079 LAIs were caused by 159 biological agents, although ten agents caused 
infections accounting for 50 % of cases (brucellosis, Q fever, hepatitis, typhoid fever, tularemia, 
tuberculosis, dermatomycoses, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, psittacosis, and 
coccidioidomycosis). “(Wurtz et al, 2016) This information is important because it shows that 
the issue of laboratories infections has been a constant issue since over 40 years ago, while the 
scientific community has gained more information on safer habits, the issue of infections still 
persists in biosafety laboratories. Wurtz et al, conducted a study on BSL-3 and BSL-4 
laboratories workers in 2016. The study surveyed 119 institutions and 23 responded. The authors 
found that “four of the 23 surveyed laboratories reported 15 LAIs caused by four different 
pathogenic organisms.” (Wurtz et al, 2016) While this only represents less than 20% of the 
surveyed laboratories, 15 different laboratories inquired infections in only 4 laboratories shows 
how important it is to have biosafety training and proper use of personal protective equipment. 
The study showed that 73% of the infections occurred in BSL-3 were there are not as many strict 
biosafety regulations as the BSL-4. Additionally, most of the infections were in laboratory 
technicians, these individuals are less experienced and trained in proper biosafety habits as 
management and other senior level laboratory workers. The authors of this study concluded that 
the rate of laboratory inquired infections has decreased dramatically since the Pike study 
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conducted in 1976. This is in large part due to the new regulations that has arisen since that study 
was conducted. However, the authors also stated, “due to training and careless behavior with 
[personal protective equipment] infections still occur. It is important to properly train and 
educate laboratory animal workers on the right and most effective way to use protective 
protection equipment.” (Wurtz et al, 2016)  
There was an additional study conducted on the connection to laboratory acquired 
infections and biosafety habits conducted by Sewell in 1995. This study focused on the 
prevalence of laboratory associated infections and how these infections occurred. These 
infections according to the data collected by Sewell “resulted from work with the infectious 
agents (21%) or animals (17%), exposure to infectious aerosols (13%), and accidents (18%).” 
(Sewell, 1995) These statistics show how infections are due to accidents and exposure to 
infectious agents that could be minimized by proper biosafety habits.  Sewell also sought to 
characterize the habits of individuals who have fewer incidents and found that “characteristics of 
persons who have few accidents include adherence to safety regulations, a respect for infectious 
agents, ‘‘defensive’’ work habits, and the ability to recognize a potentially hazardous situation.” 
(Sewell, 1995) These characteristics can be fostered by all individuals who work in biosafety 
laboratories with proper biosafety training, laboratory risk education, and proper biosafety 
culture. However, it is important to disseminate information from the studies like Sewell and 
Wurtz et al to establish the necessary “respect for infectious agents” that will prevent accidents 
and other incidents that lead to laboratory acquired infections. This respect will not only prevent 
accidents, but will also contribute to the proper biosafety culture that will encourage workers to 
use personal protective equipment.  
2.3 Effectiveness of improperly used personal protective equipment  
 The focus of this study is on the biosafety habits of laboratory workers, including the 
proper use of personal protective equipment. The most used personal protective equipment in 
BSL-2’s and BSL-3’s at Georgia State University include: the N95 respirator, lab coats, aprons, 
surgical masks, gloves, and the powered air purifying respirator. It is important to use these 
protective items, but even more important to use these items properly to ensure that they’re 
protective qualities are fully utilized.  
 The N95 is a respirator rated by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
and recommended by the CDC for protection against most cases of air contamination. However, 
this respirators effectiveness can vary based on how it is utilized. A study conducted by Reponen 
et al in 2010 found that “Overall protection factors increased when subjects passed fit 
testing.”(Reponen et al, 2010) Therefore, it is not enough to simply wear a N95 respirator to 
maximize its protective potential. However, it is still important that laboratory workers wear this 
respirator when dealing with air contamination, because they it offers more protection than the 
alternatives of a surgical mask or no protective equipment at all. This conclusion is supported by 
a study conducted by Macintyre et al. The authors of this study conducted a randomized clinical 
Page | 12 
 
trial on health workers to find the increased protective factor of the N95 respirator. The study 
population included 488 hospital workers that were above the age of 18 and were followed for 
four weeks. These individuals received pharyngeal swabs that were later cultured and analyzed 
to determine the presence of “adenoviruses, human metapneumovirus, coronavirus 229E/NL63, 
parainfluenza viruses 1, 2 or 3, influenza viruses A or B, respiratory syncytial virus A or B, 
rhinovirus A/B and coronavirus OC43/HKU1.” (Macintyre et al, 2011) The authors of the study 
found that “rates of respiratory tract infection were approximately double in the medical mask 
group compared to the N95 group in health workers who wore masks throughout their shift.” 
(Macintyre et al, 2011) The authors postulated that they were not able to find statistical 
significance, because the study may have been underpowered. However, the findings do 
reinforce the need for wearing some form of respiratory protection when dealing with air 
contamination. Similarly, is the importance for using gloves when working in a laboratory. Skin 
is the first potential point of contact for most infectious agents that laboratory workers deal with. 
Sewell emphasized this in his study and stated, “Gloves are the most important protective barrier, 
because contamination of the hands is a frequent cause of exposure to HIV, HBV, and other 
pathogens.” ( Swell, 1995) However, even the most basic personal protective equipment like 
gloves can be utilized ineffectively if the laboratory worker is not using proper biosafety habits. 
Individuals who use gloves that are not the proper size or have holes in them can increase the 
chances of laboratory acquired infections.  
 Aprons and lab coats do not currently have any literature available explaining the exact 
protection factor or infection control. However, both serve as dermal protection and can be 
thought of similarly to gloves. Lab coats and aprons should be worn anytime the laboratory 
worker is in contact with infectious agents to decrease the chances of infection. Powered air 
purifying respirators or PAPRs are another form of personal protective equipment used to deal 
with air contamination. These devices are mostly used in BSL-3’s and BSL-4’s. The PAPRs are 
usually in the form of a hood or full-face mask and utilize a powered filter that removes a certain 
amount of contaminate from the air to a level that is safer of the worker wearing it. If individuals 
are working in a laboratory where PAPRs are provided, then it is a necessity that this equipment 
is used to prevent infection. However, biosafety hazards can be increased when the worker wears 
this equipment and does not know necessary information about the PAPR. A study conducted by 
Martin et al sought to examine the performance of PAPRs over the course of an entire shift. The 
authors found that “it is impossible to look at a PAPR and tell how well it will perform over the 
course of an entire work shift. Furthermore, a visual inspection cannot tell a respirator user if the 
respirator worn daily is equipped with electrostatic filters. From results presented in this study, it 
is clear total PAPR unit performance, particularly when electrostatic filters are used, could be an 
area of concern.” (Martin et al, 2006) This study indicates that it is not enough for the worker to 
wear the PAPR the entire shift, the worker must know information about the filter and the length 
of time it provides protection. This reinforces the theme of the literature on personal protective 
equipment that proper training and use is essential to maximize the protective factors of these 
items.  
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Based on the current research regarding perception of risk exposure, training protocols 
and biosafety habits, and effectiveness of personal protection equipment, there is still a gap 
between these crucial factors and how much neglecting these factors contribute to human error 
that results in laboratory acquired infections or accidents. The goal of this study and thesis will 
be to connect this gap by collecting more primary information regarding laboratory animal 
workers risk perception and corresponding personal protective equipment use. There is an 
additional gap in the research regarding the biosafety level and corresponding perceived risk. 
This information will be compared to the participants given safety incident history to determine 
whether these factors greatly contributed to the human error that causes laboratory infections. 
3.) Methods and Procedures 
3.1 Context of Study 
 This purpose of this thesis is to be a foundation for an important study on biosafety habits 
and risk perception of Georgia State University BSL laboratories. These phases included: a 
literature review on factors that contribute to laboratory acquired infections, editing and 
completion of the survey tool and two pilot interviews of senior level BSL management.  
3.2 Rationale of Study 
 According to Wurtz et al, “The largest survey of infections was reported in 1976 by Pike, 
who found that 4079 LAIs.”(Wurtz et al, 2016) However, a recent study conducted by Karen 
Byers of the American Biological Association has found an additional 1,141 infections from 
1979 to 2005. This high number of infections represents a serious risk to laboratory workers who 
do not practice proper biosafety habits. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a preventative study 
to understand the biosafety habits and risk perception of Georgia State University laboratory 
workers to determine if these individuals are at additional risk for laboratory acquired infections.  
3.3 Study Population  
 The pilot interview portion of this survey was a senior level principal investigator who 
supervises personnel working in an ABSL2 animal laboratory, and a health behavior expert who 
has conducted extensive survey research.  
3.4 Survey Tool  
 The created survey tool was first edited to create a flow that would facilitate easy and 
accurate completion by the interviewer. This included introducing a numbering system that will 
make data entry easier. The survey tool contains 70 items and addresses the domains of biosafety 
practices, training, and attitudes towards personal protective equipment.  
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4.) Results of pilot interviews, survey editing, and literature review  
4.1 Pilot Interviews  
 The pilot interviews were conducted with the purpose of identifying weaknesses in the 
flow of the survey and to understand the best way to deliver the interview for future research. 
This interview lasted for approximately 35 minutes and resulted in two critical findings. The first 
finding was the need to add more detail and specificity to the introduction. The second finding 
was to make further editing of the diction in the survey. The second lasted approximately 45 
minutes, and the subject pointed out the potential skepticism laboratory workers may have in 
answering the survey and provided suggestions for how to address this problem.  
4.2 Survey Editing  
 Questions on this survey were numbered and finally resulted in a total of 70 items. In 
addition to numbering, the questions were edited to include skips if the certain items do not 
pertain to the participant taking the survey. This increased the flow of the survey tool. The 
survey tool’s introduction was also edited to increase specificity about the purpose of the study. 
A codebook was also created to ensure that responses and survey data will be stored properly for 
the future study. Lastly, questions and the introduction were edited for grammar, spelling, and 
punctuation.  
4.3 Literature Review  
 The results of the literature review provided insights on which domains would be 
important to include in the survey instrument developed.  
5.) DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Discussion of Study Aim 
Based on the literature review and the pilot interviews this thesis has found that the future 
study of biosafety habits, training and risk perception is necessary to determine any potential risk 
of laboratory acquired infections in GSU laboratories. Additionally, the findings in this thesis has 
found that it will be necessary to further edit the introduction of the survey tool to include 
information that will address concerns future participants may have about the use and disposition 
of survey results. This will be particularly important in establishing candid responses and full 
cooperation in all laboratories. Lastly, the literature review conducted in this thesis has found a 
lack of consistent and structured biosafety training; in addition to a significant amount of 
laboratory acquired infections since the study conducted by Pike in 1976. These infections 
represent a real risk for laboratory workers who do not practice the appropriate biosafety habits.  
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5.2 Suggestion for Future Study 
 The most important findings from this thesis will significantly help build the foundation 
for the future study conducted on university laboratory workers. The future study must be able to 
track the personal protective equipment use and training of all laboratory workers at the 
university, who agree to participate in the study. This study will highlight the need for changes in 
safety policy and allow researchers to identify potential ways to reduce the risk of laboratory 
acquired infections.  
 
5.3 Conclusion  
 This thesis was constructed to create a foundation for a future study on biosafety habits, 
training, and risk perception of GSU laboratory workers This was accomplished by creating a 
thorough literature review, editing of the future survey tool, and completion of two critical pilot 
interviews. The results of the literature review highlighted the lack of consistency in biosafety 
habits and training by laboratory workers. Additionally, the literature details the very real risk of 
laboratory acquired infections. These findings suggest that the future study that will be 
conducted is necessary to determine if there are any habits of GSU laboratory workers that will 
put them at an increased risk of laboratory acquired infections. The editing of the survey tool and 
findings from the pilot interview will greatly contribute to this future study.  
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